The Religious Significance of Kant’s Ethics by Mariña, Jacqueline
The Religious Significance of Kant's Ethics 
by Jacqueline Marina 
Love never ends. But as forprophecies, they will come to an end; as for 
tongues, they will cease; as for knowledge, it will come to an end For 
we know only in part, and we prophesy only in part, but when the 
complete comes, the partial will come to an end (1 Corinthians 
13:8f1.) 
Attention to Kant's categorical imperative has forthe most part focused on its significance for secular moral theory. Its reli-
gious meaning has received little, if any attention at all. Yet, 
while it is no doubt true that Kant's categorical imperative does not, and 
need not, appeal to theology for its validation, this does not imply that an 
in-depth investigation of the categorical imperative and the cluster of issues 
associated with it cannot reveal deep and surprising insights into the nature 
of persons and what specifically about them equips them for the religious 
life. In this paper I would like to examine Kant's categorical imperative and 
the issues attending it in the context of a person's relation to God and oth-
ers.! In effect, this amounts to an attempt to assess the implications of Kantian 
lThis approach to Kant's ethics and its relation to religion is diametrically opposed to 
that of Gordon E. Michalson in his most recent book Kant and the Problem 0/ God (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999). In this book Michalson argues that the principal thrust behind Kant's ethical 
theory, as well as behind Kant's understanding of religion, is one that leads to atheism. Michal-
son argues that there is a "principle of immanence" at work in Kant's philosophy that "is 
finally incompatible with theistic belief and which implicitly leaves Kant's own effort at 
theological mediation in shambles ... The teleological drive governing rationality's quest for 
satisfaction is simultaneously a drive to overcome otherworldliness in the portrayal of human 
destiny" (5). Michalson's claim rests on a fundamental oversight regarding Kant's philosophy. 
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moral theory on theology's understanding of the first and second great com-
mandments. This is no doubt a huge task, one that cannot be accomplished 
within the confines of a single paper. What I would like to do here, how-
ever, is to sketch the main lines of relevance to religion of Kant's categorical 
imperative in the hope of spurring further discussion and debate. 
The paper will be divided into two parts. The first part of the paper 
will be concerned with foundational issues. These have to do with what 
Kantian moral requirements reveal about the structure of human rationality, 
and what this rationality implies. I show that these requirements and their 
implications supply us with concrete and fruitful guidelines as to how we 
should conceive of what equips persons for the religious life. Key to this 
analysis is the concept of self-transcendence. I argue that Kant's understand-
ing of the relation of the moral law to rational yet finite beings such as our-
selves provides a great deal of insight into what we should expect from an 
analysis of self-transcendence. This conceptual work lays the groundwork 
for an understanding of the proper relation of the individual to God and to 
the neighbor. 
In the second part of the paper I examine the relation of the categorical 
imperative to the second great commandment to love the neighbor as one-
self. This part of the paper will explore the relation of the demands of the 
categorical imperative to the demands of Christian agapic love. I will argue 
that the concepts overlap to a surprising degree. Moreover, many of the 
conceptual resources that fill out Kant's moral theory can be fruitfully ap-
plied to a theoretical analysis of agape. Lastly, I will explore what these im-
plications reveal about how we should love God. 
He does not seem to appreciate fully enough the significance of the primacy of practical 
reason in Kant. According to what practical reason tells us, we are not simply the product of 
intra-worldly causes. From a practical point of view we are members of an intelligible world 
and of the Kingdom of Ends. As rational, ethical beings we know our nature to transcend the 
world of sense. Hence, it is only fitting that our rational hopes should lead us to expect a final 
destiny not tied to this world. It thus seems to me utterly wrongheaded to suppose that Kant's 
philosophy ultimately leads to the materialistic atheism that we fmd, for instance, in Marx. 
For a more in-depth discussion of the specific character of the postulates concerning God, the 
soul, and immortality to which practical reason commits us, see my article "Making Sense of 
Kant's Highest Good," Kant·Studien 91 (2000): 1-27. 
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I. 
Self-Transcendence and the Categorical Imperative. The ability to tran-
scend the self lies at the heart of what it means to be genuinely religious. 
Through this ability the individual is enabled to connect with what is other 
than the self. However, it not only enables the self to surpass its finitude and 
particularity in order to genuinely make contact with the other. It is also at 
the ground of a person's ability to ask questions regarding the nature of the 
totality of the world in which s/he and others are situated. Questions re-
garding such totalities lead to further questions regarding what encompasses 
and grounds them. But these are precisely religious questions. In order to ask 
such questions in the right way a person must be able to surpass her own 
parochial concerns. S/he must be able to understand herself as situated in a 
world of other rational beings whose self-fulfillment is just as important as 
hers. Genuine religion is the opposite of solipsism. The solipsistic individual 
understands the world and others in it as an extension of him or herself. 
These are viewed only in terms of his or her projects and concerns and how 
they can best be furthered. While no doubt it is also possible to ask ques-
tions regarding the totality of one's experience of the world and others from 
such a solipsistic perspective, to do so is a perversion of the religious impulse 
and blocks the possibility of genuine self-transcendence. The genuinely 
religious individual, on the other hand, is spurred by a need to understand 
the world as a place where all moral beings can perfect themselves and in 
this way find self-fulfillment. 
For Kant the locus of self-transcendence is not speculative but practical. 
It is grounded in the unconditioned demand that the moral law places upon 
us. The nature of this unconditioned demand is such that it immediately 
places the self in relation to other rational selves.2 This relation is, moreover, 
not one in which the other is valued in terms the self's preexisting projects 
and concerns. Rather, the other must be valued as an end in him or herself. 
In order to flesh out these claims, let me first turn to some key metaethical 
arguments in Kant's ethics. 
2 As Onora O'Neill aptly notes, "despite long traditions of reading Kant as presenting a 
'philosophy of the subject,' his starting point is rather that of plurality ... Kant's distinctiveness 
lies in the fact that his discursive grounding of reason presupposes plurality, and the possibility 
of community; it does not presuppose 'atomistic subjects, actual communities or ideal com-
munities'" ("Vindicating Reason," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992J, 280-308, at 308 n. 17). 
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In this section I argue that the most important issue affecting a fruitful 
analysis of the concept of self-transcendence has to do with the nature and 
source of value judgments regarding the other. What are the possible 
grounds of our regard for the other, and what should the nature of this 
regard be? Can it be that the grounds on account of which we value the 
other affect the nature of our regard for him or her? Questions such as these 
are key to an understanding of the possibility of self-transcendence, since it 
is only insofar as I can genuinely enter into the life of the other that I can 
move beyond myself as a locus of concern.3 But a condition of my entering 
into the life of the other has to do with the nature of the value I attach to 
him or her. 
Foundational to Kant's ethics is the insight that the ground of one's 
regard for the other determines the nature of this regard There are, for 
Kant, two possible sources grounding our regard forthe other, the empirical 
and the rationaL Either we can care about another because we just so hap-
pen to have desires that dispose us to caring for him or her, or an a priori 
rational principle governing the causality of the will determines the nature 
of the good and hence the grounds of the worth of the other, and thus what 
should be desired However, only a practical law binding all rational beings 
(one which all rational beings must acknowledge as binding) can be the 
ground of a rational and objective determination of the good Were it im-
possible for practical reason to determine a priori that which is a necessary 
object of desire, we could only understand our desires as determined in the 
order of causes. Failing an account of what should, and hence can be desired, 
all we would have left to work with are the desires we in fact have. But such 
desires are facts about ourselves that supervene upon our physical constitu-
tion, and as such they are causally determined We have those kinds of de-
sires insofar as we are affected from without. They are particular insofar as 
they are the desires of an embodied being that happens to have them given a 
past nexus of causes that resulted in this particular physical entity having 
31t is important to note that this is true not only of my relationship to other fmite 
rational selves, but of my relationship to the divine life as well. There is very big difference 
between the individual that merely fears God as the one who has power over him or her, and 
the individual that loves God because God is good Only the latter individual has begun to 
enter into the divine life, that is, has made God's ends (the unconditioned valuing of rational 
creatures) his own. Only the individual that comprehends the value of these ends independ-
ently (and not because they have been commanded by great power) can really enter into the 
divine life, since only in this way can it intelligently be said that s/he shares God's ends. 
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these desires. However, if our concept of the good were to depend upon 
how we are affected, not only would this imply that the will is ineluctably 
heteronomously determined, it would also imply that the idea of the good 
must be thought of as variable and relative to the particular susceptibilities of 
sensuously affected beings. Kant notes that although our reason would be 
able to discern 
the connection of means and intentions ... the practical maxims 
which follow merely as means from the concept of the good 
never contain anything good in itself as the object of the will but 
only something good for something else. In this way, the good 
would be only the useful, and that for which it useful must always 
lie outside the will, in feeling [Empfindung].4 
Since the susceptibilities of individual subjects can only be determined 
empirically, a universally valid concept of the good cannot be based upon 
them. But once such a concept is lacking, the individual is forced back in 
upon herself for her understanding of the good, in particular insofar as she is 
a body in a spatio-temporal world Her concept of the good must then be 
reducible to those objects constituting her well-being because she desires 
them. In such a scenario, her subjectivity becomes absolute . and cannot be 
transcended, for that which is good and which is, as such, an object of value, 
can be defined relative only to her given desires. Why these desires are her 
desires cannot receive any universally communicable rational justifica-
tion-they simply are a fact of her constitution. The possibility of a genuine 
communication with the other and a shared outlook on what is objectively 
of value is thereby blocked. 
Moreover, this implies that if an individual's only criterion for what is 
of value must have its origin in desires that are caused and are hers only 
because of the particular spatio-temporallocus that she occupies, it will be 
impossible for the individual to value the other as an end in him or herself. 
This is because whatever value the individual attaches to the other will hinge 
upon the desires that she happens to have. If this is the case, there would be 
no criterion of objective value establishing the worth of the other, but 
'Critique o/Practical Reason, trans. Louis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 61; 
henceforth Prussian Academy Edition pagination will be noted immediately following the 
volwne nwnber in brackets: [5: 59-60]. 
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rather, the other's worth would hinge on the seWs contingently existing 
desires. In such a scenario, the self becomes the arbiter of the worth of the 
other. But to think of myself as the arbiter of the worth of the other is pre-
cisely not to consider the other as an end in himself, that is, an individual 
that must claim my moral regard independently of my desires. 
But Kant's claims are even stronger than this. In the second Critique he 
asserts that "all material practical principles are, as such, of one and the same 
kind and belong under the principle of self-love or one's own happiness."5 
Material practical principles are principles constructed in order to achieve 
given desired ends; as such their content depends upon those ends. Their 
adoption thus hinges upon the existence of contingent desires making up 
what Kant dubs "the lower faculty of desire." Kant's claim, then, is that 
practical principles designed so that one can satisfy desires stemming from 
the lower faculty of desire are associated with the principle of self-love. Note 
that his claim here is an even stronger one than the already controversial 
claim found in the Groundwork. There Kant notes that the beneficent ac-
tions of the "friend of man," that is, the individual with a sympathetic tem-
perament who acts from this inclination (the inner pleasure s/he finds in 
spreading happiness around her) have no moral worth. He concedes, how-
ever, that such an individual might act without any further motive of vanity 
or self-interest.6 In other words, given the account in the Groundwork,it 
seems quite possible that an individual can be genuinely other-directed even 
if he acts only from inclination. In the second Critique, however, Kant tells 
us that all actions motivated by the lower faculty of desire are connected 
with self-love or one's own happiness. These two statements seem to be at 
odds with one another, since if this is the case the actions of the "friend of 
man" would then be connected with self-interest. 
The reasons why the actions of the friend of man have no moral worth 
have been extensively discussed in the secondary literature. It is not only 
that policies grounded in the inclinations generally do not reliably coincide 
with what morality demands. We can easily imagine an individual whose 
sympathetic temperament has been honed so as to become a matter of habit, 
as Hume suggests. We can even imagine that it has been habituated to re-
SIbid., 21 [5: 22]. 
6Kant notes that "there are moreover, many persons so sympathetically constituted that 
without any motive of vanity or selfishness they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy, 
and rejoice in the contentment of others which they have made possible" (Foundations a/the 
Metaphysics a/Morals, trans. Louis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 14 [398]. 
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spond impartially. But as Barbara Herman notes, "while sympathy can give 
an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest 
in its being right."7 It is one thing, however, to say that action grounded in 
inclination has no moral worth, and another to say that all such action is 
connected with self-love or the principle of furthering one's own happiness. 
The stronger claim is what interests us here, since this would show that the 
ground of one's valuing has a decisive impact upon its content. In other 
words, we need to show that the decision to attribute value only to the de-
sires one happens to have has a determinate influence on the content of 
those desires. This influence is such that in cases wherein action is simply in 
accordance with the strongest desire one happens to have, the content of 
one's valuing never moves past the circle of one's self-concern. 
Kant's analysis of non-morally motivated action as presented in the 
second Critique has come under a good bit of fire. For his presentation of 
the nature of such non-morally motivated action there seems to suggest that 
the object of all action grounded in the lower faculty of desire is the pleasure 
one expects from a desire's satisfaction. If Kant's understanding of non-mor-
ally motivated action as grounded in the principle of self-love is dependent 
upon this too simplistic an understanding of the psychology of desire, his 
analysis would thereby be invalidated. Kant notes the following: 
Pleasure from the representation of the existence of a thing, in so 
far as it is a determining ground of the desire for this thing, is 
based upon the susceptibility of the subject because it depends 
upon the actual existence of the object ... It is practical only in so 
far as the faculty of desire is determined by the actual existence of 
the object. Now happiness is a rational being's consciousness of 
the agreeableness of life which without interruption accompanies 
his whole existence, and to make this the supreme ground for the 
determination of choice constitutes the principle of self-love. 8 
It has often been argued that Kant's portrays non-morally motivated 
action as hedonistic; as such he has been accused of putting forth a rather 
crude understanding of the psychology of action. T.H. Green, who first 
7Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993),5. 
8Critique of Practical Reason, 20 [5: 22]. 
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came up with this line of criticism, notes that "Kant's error lies in supposing 
that there is no alternative between the determination of desire by the antici-
pation of pleasure and its determination by the conception of a moral law. ,,9 
On this model of the lower faculty of desire, what moves me to do x is the 
pleasure I expect from achieving the end of action x. Now while the deep 
structure of Kant's theory need not fall prey to the criticisms discussed here, 
in the second Critique Kant does often describe non-morally motivated 
action in a way that fits this pattern. Hence he writes that 
if the determination of the will rests on the feelings of agreeable-
ness or disagreeableness which he expects from any cause, it is all 
the same to him through what kind of representation he is af-
fected. The only thing he considers in making a choice is how 
great, how long-lasting, how easily obtained, and how often re-
peated this agreeableness is. lo 
On this model, the ultimate end of non-moral action is the pleasure 
one expects from the objects desired The objects of desire are themselves 
ultimately unimportant, since they are mere means to the achievement of 
the agreeableness of life. 
But surely not all non-moral actions are so motivated, and in fact, the 
psychology of human motivation is much more complex than this. We 
would be hard pressed to interpret the self-destructive actions of many per-
sons (for instance, those of women who repeatedly find themselves in abu-
sive relationships) as motivated solely in terms of the pleasure principle. 
Hence, what moves me to desire x is often not the pleasure that I expect 
from realizing x, but rather, I desire this x because I value it. My reasons for 
valuing it may, moreover, have nothing to do with either the pleasure that I 
expect from it or from moral considerations. 
Although it would be mistaken to assume that the end of all non-moral 
action is pleasure, a sophisticated theory of human motivation can account 
for inclinations as originating in our susceptibilities to being affected from 
9T.H. Green, Collected Works, vol. 2, 119, cited by Terence Irwin, "Morality and Per-
sonality: Kant and Green." in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, ed. Allan Wood ~thaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1984),31-56, at 43. 
IOCritique o/Practical Reason, 22 [5: 23]. 
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without (pleasure and pain).!! As such, inclinations are grounded in causes 
lying outside the will. The specific character of these susceptibilities may be 
influenced by environmental and genetic factors. Moreover, while my non-
moral desires can have complex causal histories involving such factors, my 
ultimate aim in achieving the objects of these desires need not be the plea-
sure to be gotten from them. As has been pointed out numerous times in 
the literature, objections to the deep structure of Kant's argument often rest 
on a failure to distinguish between the end of an action and the reasons for 
adopting such an end.!2 As such, while the end of non-morally motivated 
action need not be the pleasure one expects from an object, the reasons one 
has for doing x may involve the satisfaction of desires one has in virtue of 
one's susceptibilities to being affected from without. It will become clearer 
as we proceed that this thesis is all that Kant really needs in order to estab-
lish that all non-morally motivated action is rooted in the principle of self-
love. 
Even if a hedonistic theory of the lower faculty of desire is one to 
which Kant need not ultimately commit, his claim that all non-moral action 
ultimately stems from the principle of self-love is more deeply embedded in 
his ethical theory. An understanding of the deep structure of this claim will 
further illuminate why it is that only action which takes into account the 
unconditioned demand that the other makes really allows one to move 
beyond the circle of one's self-concern. We have already shown above why 
an individual motivated by the inclinations alone cannot value the other as 
an end in him/herself. This means, for instance, that insofar as the actions of 
the friend of man are motivated by inclination alone, they are not actions 
that are directed to the other taken as an end in himself. However, we need 
to see our way more clearly into just how such action is connected with the 
!lin his article, "Hedonism, Heteronomy, and Kant's Principle of Happiness," Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989): 42-72, Andrews Reath points out that what is most signifi-
cant about heteronomous actions is that they have their origin in causes lying outside the will 
and not that they are motivated by a desire for pleasure. 
12See, for instance, Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 103. Barbara Herman puts the matter very clearly when she notes: 
"Errors about these matters can come from thinking that 'motive' and 'end' (the object of 
action) are merely reciprocal concepts. They can be, but they are not always so. The end is 
that state of affairs the agent intends his action to bring about. The motive of an action, what 
moves the agent to act for a certain object, is the way he takes the object of his action to be 
good, and hence reason-giving. The motive explains his interest in the end" (The Practice of 
Moral Judgment, 25). 
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principle of self-love. If Kant's theory is to have something significant to say 
about the conditions attending self-transcendence, the reasons why such 
actions are connected with the principle of self-love cannot be that the end 
toward which they are directed is pleasure. 
It is possible that one's actions are directed to specific ends which are 
themselves not valued for the pleasure they can afford It can at the same 
time be true that the reasons for the adoption of these ends are rooted in 
ways in which the agent has been affected in the past. But if this is the case, 
why is basing one's action in one's causal history alone action in accordance 
with the principle of self-love? The answer is not, as we have seen, that the 
individual who acts in accordance with such a principle is out to get plea-
sure. The issue rather lies in that in acting in such a way one makes one's 
causal history the basis of the ultimate criterion determining one's choices. 
In doing so one makes the self and its specific particularities the locus of the 
determination of what is of value. To act on the principle of satisfying those 
desires one simply happens to have is to act on the principle of self-love 
because to do so is to validate the choices of the self qua particular individ-
ual. Attitudes toward the other stemming from these desires alone, however 
other-directed they may seem (as in the case of the friend of man), cannot 
genuinely be directed toward the other qua other, that is, as an individual 
having a claim on our regard toward him or her irrespective of our likes and 
dislikes. In fact, once we recognize that the other has a moral claim on our 
regard toward him/her and frame our principles in accordance with such a 
claim, we are no longer framing our principles in light of the desires we 
simply happen to have. 
Moreover, if it is true that insofar as the moral law exerts an uncondi-
tioned demand upon us it functions as an incentive, to frame one's princi-
ples only in light of the desires one happens to have constitutes a willful 
disregard of the claims of the other upon oneself. Such a willful disregard of 
such claims is more than self-love. It is what Kant calls self-conceit. Kant 
distinguishes between self-love and self-conceit in the course of his discussion 
of respect for the moral law: 
All inclinations taken together (which can be brought under a 
fairly tolerable system, whereupon their satisfaction is called hap-
piness) constitutes self-regard (solipsismus). This consists either of 
self-love, which is a predominant benevolence toward one's self 
(philautia) or of self-satisfaction (arrogantia). The former is called, 
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more particularly, selfishness; the latter, self-conceit. Pure practical 
reason merely checks selfishness, for selfishness, as natural and 
active in us even prior to the moral law, is restricted by the moral 
law to agreement with the law; when this is done, selfishness is 
called rational self-love. But it strikes self-conceit down, since all 
claims of self-esteem which precede conformity to the moral law 
are null and void For the certainty of a disposition which agrees 
with this law is the first condition of any worth of the person (as 
will soon be made clear), and any presumption [to worth] prior to 
this is false and opposed to the law. 13 
As noted above, the inclinations are in principle subjective, since they 
stem from the receptivity of inner sense, and owe their existence to the 
physical and psychological constitution of the agent. The drive toward their 
satisfaction is thus solipsistic, since universal validity cannot be ascribed to 
them. Rational self-love is the drive toward the fulfillment of these inclina-
tions insofar as this drive is checked by the moral law. On the other hand, 
self-conceit consists in the attempt to ascribe universal validity to the subjec-
tive inclinations: the "propensity to make the subjective determining 
grounds of one's choice into an objective determining ground of the will in 
general can be called self-love; when it makes itself legislative and an uncon-
ditioned practical principle, it can be called self-conceit."14 While self-love 
consists in the drive towards the realization of ends bringing satisfaction 
with one's condition, self-conceit is the attempt to ascribe an absolute value 
to those ends. It thus involves a tendency to think of the self as the source of 
all value; in such a case the empirically determined desires of the individual 
are thought of as the ultimate criterion for establishing the value ascribed to 
ends. 
As Andrews Reath has noted, self-conceit "turns out for this reason to 
be a form of value which one only achieves at the expense of others," for 
while self-love is a "tendency to take one's inclinations to provide sufficient 
reasons for one's actions," self-conceit is a "tendency to treat your inclina-
tions as providing reasons for the actions of others, or to take your desires as 
lJCritique o/Practical Reason, 76 [5: 73]. 
14Ibid., 77 [5: 74]. 
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sources of value to which they should defer.,,15 While rational self-love, inso-
far as it is checked by the moral law, allows one to view other people's incli-
nations as sufficient reasons for their own actions, "self-conceit would pro-
duce a form of first person egoism in which I act as though my inclinations 
could provide laws for the conduct of others; it expresses a desire that they 
serve or defer to my interests."16 Ascribing an absolute priority to the ends 
of the self, the attitude of self-conceit toward others is always that of domi-
nation and manipulation. It is thereby opposed to the fundamental moral 
attitude, that is, the recognition of others as ends in themselves. Given that 
the concept of a categorical imperative is that of a law that is absolutely 
binding on all rational wills, it is opposed to the principle of self-conceit, 
which strives to make the self and its subjective desires the ground of abso-
lute value. 
While the moral law thus limits and constrains self-love to expressions 
that harmonize with the ends of others, it strikes down self-conceit. This is 
because self-conceit is the attitude in fundamental opposition to the moral 
law, and no reconciliation between the two is possible. Kant's description of 
self-conceit accords with the Christian account of the dynamics of pride, 
which has been traditionally understood as the root of all evils. Like pride, 
self-conceit is the attempt to give one's subjective desires an absolute value. 
Amounting to an attempt to set up the finite and conditioned self as the 
arbiter of all value, it is the root expression of the authority problem pro-
ducing enmity with God 
The attitude of self-conceit stands in direct opposition to the autonomy 
of the will. The will is autonomous when and insofar it is able to judge, and 
to be moved by, a standard that can be rationally justified as having absolute 
worth. Such a standard has this kind of worth because all rational wills must 
recognize it. On the other hand, self-conceit is the attempt to make the 
conditioned desires of the finite self absolute, that is, to give them a universal 
validity that they cannot, in principle, have. Insofar as its principal dynamic 
is that of decreeing "subjective conditions of self-love as laws," it rests on a 
lie in the attempt to make that which is really only subjective into 
something objective. As such, this attitude blocks self-transcendence, that is, 
15 Andrews Reath. "Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and 
the Influence of Inclination," Kant-Studien 80 (1989): 284-302, at 293. 
16Ibid. 
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the move beyond the finite self and its concerns toward an ability to value 
that which can in principle be shared by others as a standard of value. 
Thus far I have shown why attitudes toward others grounded in incli-
nation alone cannot be the ground of genuine self-transcendence. The flip 
side of this implies that only insofar as values are informed by an uncondi-
tioned demand is self-transcendence possible. The unconditioned demand 
that the other places upon us has a metaphysical basis. It is a commonplace 
that for Kant this metaphysical basis is rooted in the fact that the other is a 
rational being. While correct, this way of putting the matter obscures the 
deep structure and implications of Kant's ethics. For Kant rationality does 
not mean something like the ability to do quadratic equations, although too 
often Kant's meaning has been construed in just this way. It simply means 
the ability to recognize and take an interest in something the value of which 
does not depend upon an individual's subjective desires. That which has this 
kind of value must be recognized as such by all individuals having the capac-
ity to transcend their particularity and subjectivity. Rationality is thus the 
capacity to take an interest in that which has unconditioned worth. But just 
what has such unconditioned worth is in fact this very capacity of moving 
beyond self-interest and entering into community with the other as one that 
must be considered an end in him or herself. The other has such worth 
because s/he too can transcend her merely subjective desires and enter into 
community. Hence the ability to enter into communion with other rational 
selves is just what constitutes rationality and is the ground of the claim that 
the person has upon another's regard. There is a surprising circularity to this 
claim that is not vicious. The circularity consists in the fact that rationality 
consists in the ability to enter into communion with the other, while the 
other with whom I am able to enter into communion is defined as anyone 
who has this same ability to transcend his or her self-concern and enter into 
community with others. 
This point has the further consequence that while that which has un-
conditioned value cannot be determined aside from the community of ratio-
nal selves constituting and recognizing such value, this does not mean that 
any arbitrary community can make a joint decision as to what constitutes 
worth and what does not. The only criterion for membership in the com-
munity of rational selves is the ability to transcend the circle of one's self-
concern and enter into community with the other. This rules out the valid-
ity of a particular community's stipulation regarding which selves have 
worth and which do not on account of how they mayor may not fit with 
the community's self-definition and goals. Whatever particular projects or 
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concerns an individual or group of individuals might have is irrelevant to the 
question of the regard due to them as ends in themselves. What marks indi-
viduals as having unconditioned worth is their capacity to enter into genu-
ine relation with others. This capacity implies the ability to enter into the 
life of the other, to value the other as an end in him or herself and to there-
by take an interest in his or her well-being. 
In this section I have argued that implications of Kantian moral require-
ments illuminate the nature of the "metaphysical center" making persons 
capable of connecting with God and others. 17 This metaphysical center is the 
capacity a person has for self-transcendence, for moving beyond the confines 
of his or her self-concern. It is intrinsically linked with what Kant calls "the 
higher faculty of desire," that is, our capacity to take an interest in the moral 
law and the claims that others as ends in themselves have upon us. In the 
next section I will compare the relation of Kant's categorical imperative to 
the demands of Christian agapic love. In the course of this analysis, I discuss 
in more depth the implications that the grounds of our attitudes toward 
others have upon their content. In fact, Kant's ethics is distinguished by the 
claim that the ground of our ascriptions of worth has a decisive impact upon 
just what it is we consider as having worth. 
II. 
Love for God and Neighbor and the Categorical Imperative. No doubt the 
philosophical and theological literature on the subject of agape alone is itself 
vast. In this section I will limit myself to an analysis of generally undisputed 
claims about agape, although the results of this analysis may lead into areas 
of controversy. In his classic study on agape Gene Outka identifies two 
features of agape closely related to one another. First, "agape is regard for the 
neighbor which in crucial respects is independent and unalterable." 18 Second, 
"the regard is for every person qua human existent, to be distinguished from 
those special traits, actions, etc., which distinguish particular personalities."19 
To say that agapic regard is independent means that it does not depend on 
any traits specific to a particular individual that the other may possess. As 
17While it is clear that for Kant a doctrine of a metaphysical soul-substance is out of the 
question, as Kant makes clear in the second Critique, the moral law as a fact of reason carries 
with it the metaphysical implication of transcendental freedom. 
18Gene Outka,Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972),9. 
19Ibid. 
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such, the quality of agapic regard is not proportioned to what the neighbor 
has made of him or herself and what s/he may possess. In contrast, preferen-
tial relationships such as erotic love and friendship are characterized as de-
pendent upon their objects. Kierkegaard, for instance, claims that the person 
who has these kinds of preferential relations always stands in jeopardy of 
losing what makes the relationship of value to him or her. One cares about 
the specific qualities an individual may have and how these qualities mesh 
with one's own interests. One cares, too, about whether the other will re-
turn one's affections or esteem. This, for Kierkegaard, is the ground of the 
"anxiety which makes erotic love and friendship dependent upon their ob-
jects, the anxiety which can kindle jealousy, the anxiety which can bring 
one to despair."2o Kierkegaard also notes that while it may be possible to 
continue in a preferential relationship no matter how the other treats one (a 
relation of co-dependency like the one portrayed in 0/ Human Bondage 
comes to mind), the preferential relationship becomes impossible once the 
other has changed. He writes 
You can also continue to love your beloved and your friend no 
matter how they treat you, but you cannot truthfully continue to 
call them beloved and friend when they, sorry to say, have truly 
changed. No change, however, can take your neighbor from you, 
for it is not your neighbor who holds you fast ... it is your love 
which holds your neighbor fast. 21 
Kierkegaard's point is that a regard for the other that is dependent 
upon what the other makes of him or herself, or how the other reacts, is 
dependent on factors outside one's control. This reveals something about 
the nature of this kind of regard for the other. It depends on how we are 
affected from without. Now the desires that we simply find ourselves having 
(in contrast to those we determine through considerations regarding what 
has objective worth) are connected with our physical constitution. Insofar as 
we are physical beings, we are affected from without. If my regard for the 
other depends upon how the other affects me, I allow my particular suscep-
tibilities as an embodied being to determine my regard for the other. But 
lOS0ren Kierkegaard, Works a/Love, ed and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995),66. 
21Ibid,65. 
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agape, as Kierkegaard points out, is independent of how the neighbor may 
affect me-it is not the neighbor that holds me fast. This is also to say that 
my particular susceptibilities, my likes and dislikes, should have nothing to 
do with the reasons for my agapic regard for the other. The independence of 
agapic regard from how the neighbor may affect one thus connects in im-
portant ways with Kant's ethics. For Kant the proper ground of our regard 
for the other cannot lie in our particular susceptibilities, that is, in how the 
other affects US.22 
The correlate of the independence of agapic regard for the other is that 
it is the other qua human existent that calls for my regard. Special traits and 
particularities of the other should not ground my regard for him or her. If 
my regard depends on such special traits, it is dependent upon how he or she 
can affect me and is thus grounded in my susceptibilities. Moreover, this 
kind of regard results in preferential relationships. I care for those having 
specific characteristics that can affect me in a certain way, and my regard is 
dependent upon this effect. As such, it is not unconditional. If the person 
changes, s/he can no longer be the object of my esteem. 
On the other hand, regard for the other based on a prior claim of his or 
her value qua human existent is independent both of my susceptibilities and, 
correlatively, of the other's peculiarities. It is my recognition of such an a 
priori claim that holds fast my esteem for him or her. As such, agapic regard 
has permanent stability and does not fluctuate. Kierkegaard notes that it is 
"not your neighbor who holds you fast ... it is your love which holds your 
neighbor fast." Such esteem for the neighbor does not depend on anything 
changeable about him or her. It depends, instead, upon an essential feature 
of his or her personhood existing prior to anything he or she has done. As 
such, the other is irreducibly valuable, and one's love holds the neighbor fast 
in the sense that it insists on recognizing those qualities essential to the other 
even when the neighbor may not recognize them him or herself. 
A crucial implication of these features of agapic regard is that one 
neighbor's well-being is as important as another's. If my concern for the 
other cannot be grounded in the way the other can affect me and therefore 
in my susceptibilities, a person's idiosyncratic qualities are irrelevant to the 
esteem in which I must hold him or her. What is of significance is simply 
22Important co=ections between Kant and Kierkegaard have been pointed out by 
Ronald M. Green in his book, Kierkegaard and Kant: the Hidden Debt (Albany: State U niver-
sity of New York Press, 1992). 
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that quality of the other in virtue of which he or she has an irreducible claim 
on my concern. But such a quality is a generic endowment that does not 
allow me to discriminate between one person and another, and this implies 
that I am to regard all persons equally. In this respect it is interesting to note 
that Kierkegaard claims that " ... if there is one other person whom you in 
the Christian sense love as yourself or in whom you love the neighbor, then 
you love all people.,,23 Once one has learned the secret behind valuing one 
person as a neighbor, one should be able to recognize and value all persons 
as neighbors. 
Let us compare these characteristics of agapic regard with Kant's central 
ethical claims. The regard owed the other, according to Kant, cannot be 
grounded in the inclinations. The inclinations are rooted in our capacity to 
be affected from without. Hence the regard we owe the other cannot be 
grounded in our particular susceptibilities. As such, this regard cannot de-
pend upon how the other can affect us and hence cannot depend upon his 
or her idiosyncratic characteristics. To ground our concern for the other in 
the inclinations, that is, in those desires we simply happen to have, is, ac-
cording to Kant, to act in accordance with the principle of self-love. In his 
discourse on agape Kierkegaard, too, claims that all preferential love is sim-
ply another form of self-love. He tells us that "Christianity has misgivings 
about erotic love and friendship simply because preferential love in passion 
or passionate preference is actually another form of self-love."24 
Notice the strong connection between preferential love and the ground 
of such regard. Preference for one person over another is grounded in their 
differences from one another. Because person a is different from person b, 
the two people affect us in different ways. Hence our preference for one 
over the other is ultimately grounded in how they affect us and in how their 
impressions on us both satisfy and incite certain kinds of desires. Preferential 
love is thus ultimately rooted in the inclinations and in our capacity for 
being affected from without. Hence there is a very significant sense in which 
the ground of our regard for the other determines the content of that regard. 
If we base our regard for the other on how he or she affects us, our regard 
cannot but be of the kind that is sensitive to differences between persons. 
One person will be valued more highly than another because association 
with him or her satisfies our idiosyncratic preferences. Other-regard 
2J Works 0/ Love, 2l. 
2%id,53. 
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grounded in inclination is of the kind that judges and discriminates between 
persons. 
While all preferential relations are grounded in the inclinations, it 
would be incorrect to claim that all regard for others rooted in the inclina-
tions must be preferential. Hume's example of a temperament that has been 
habituated to act sympathetically and impartially is a case in point. Never-
theless, other-regard rooted in the inclinations is not directed by the uncon-
ditioned claim the other has on our regard qua human existent. Failing guid-
ance by an unconditioned demand, it is hard to see how a sympathetic tem-
perament can, by itself, make its way through the maze of moral dilemmas 
requiring intelligence and delicacy in discernment and judgement. Such 
discernment requires an awareness of that which has unconditioned worth 
in the attempt to make decisions that impact different people in various 
ways. A sympathetic temperament alone, no matter how well it has been 
trained to be impartial, is not equipped to think (rather than feel) through 
issues and to respect that which has absolute worth. If a decision that ulti-
mately respects the unconditioned and equal worth of others is indeed 
reached through a sympathetic temperament alone, this can only have been 
by accident. 
Thus far I have shown in what sense preferential love such as eros and 
friendship correspond to regard for the other rooted in the inclinations. In 
the course of my analysis I have also demonstrated the relations existing 
between the ground of our regard for the other and the content of such 
regard in respect of inclination and preferential relations. I have not yet 
discussed the ground of agapic regard and how it relates to the ground of the 
categorical imperative'S unconditional demand regarding the other. This is a 
much more complicated issue. Why, according to Kant, does the other 
make a claim on our unconditioned regard? While the answer to this ques-
tion can be discussed at length, for our purposes we need only to mention 
what was noted before, namely, the other is of unconditioned worth be-
cause of his or her capacity for self-transcendence and ability to enter into 
community with the other. Moreover, we can value the other because we 
ourselves have such a capacity for self-transcendence. This capacity presup-
poses Kant's notion of transcendental freedom, which, he tells us, is the ratio 
essendi of the moral law. If it is to be possible for us to value that which is 
objectively valuable and hence should be valued, then our valuings cannot be 
determined by causes lying outside of our will. If this is Kant's answer, how 
does it mesh with Christianity'S understanding of the ground of agapic re-
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gard? The answer is complicated by the fact that this question is one of the 
most contested issues regarding agape. 
There are two basic positions that can be taken in this regard. The first 
has been taken by Brunner, Nygren and others: agape cannot be grounded 
in the recognition of the worth of essential characteristics that all persons 
share.25 They argue that if agape is dependent upon pre-existing traits having 
objective worth, then the element of grace in agape is not really grace. Just as 
God's love for humans is unmerited grace, so humans are commanded to 
love one another as God has loved them, regardless of their characteristics 
and habits. If agape were in fact to have a ground, that is, if it were to be the 
proper response to an objective worth, it would lose its unmerited character 
and hence its close ties to grace. This understanding of agape has the most 
affinities with a grounding of Christian ethics in divine commands. 
The second position identifies agapic regard as the proper response to 
essential features that all human beings share. This position is more closely 
tied with Catholic approaches to Christian ethics. One example of such an 
approach is that of Jacques Maritain, who makes reference to a "metaphysi-
cal center" in the other that claims our acknowledgement of value. As 
Outka correctly notes, that agapic regard is the proper response to essential 
features of the other by no means vitiates grace. The idea that there is some-
thing about the neighbor that makes a claim on our regard for him or her 
need not imply "worth apart from God or which God merely recognizes. 
An account of characteristics to be appraised will not necessarily treat them 
as simply belonging to the person in some utterly autonomous way or as 
traits which the person has attained by his own initiative."26 This is espe-
cially true insofar as it is stressed that the very possession of these traits is 
due to the person's having been created by God in God's image. 
While it is no doubt true that Kant's ethics cannot be understood to 
coincide with the first position outlined above, I do not find any significant 
25See Outka's discussion in Agape: An Ethical Analysis, chapter 6. 
26Earlier in this passage Outka makes the following important observation: "It is also 
hard to see how every scheme involving appraisal of generic characteristics all men have and 
perhaps equally share can be held always to undermine grace. That question depends on what 
those objectively valuable characteristics are, and how they are known. One might still relate 
such characteristics to belief in God's action. They could be tied, for instance, to a doctrine of 
creation which need not idolize the creature or require that grace be explained or justified by 
something outside itself. Any generic worth or value already existent may precisely reflect 
God's sovereign creative action" (ibid., 159). 
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points of conflict between it and the second position. Both emphasize that 
the regard due the other is grounded in certain essential features shared by all 
persons. No doubt the second position on agape moves beyond Kant's cen-
tral points of emphasis in stressing that the possession of the kind of nature 
to which agapic regard is due results from having been created in God's 
image. But as long as both parties focus on human nature as that which 
grounds the regard due the other, there need not be substantial disagreement 
on this point. 
If however, the agapic demand is understood as grounded only in the 
will of God, then there may be substantial divergences between the Chris-
tian understanding of agape and Kant's ethics. While it is no doubt true that 
for Kant the moral law and the will of God must be conceived of as con-
forming to one another, the deeper question is whether the will of God 
must be thought of and defined in terms of the moral law, or whether the 
moral law must be thought of in terms of the will of God The problem is, 
therefore, which must be prior in the order of knowledge, knowledge of the 
will of God, or knowledge of the moral law? If knowledge of the will of 
God is made the condition of our knowledge of the moral law, we would 
then have no criterion through which we could judge whether such a will 
was a holy one. In other words, we would have no criterion through which 
to judge whether the will which reveals itself is that of God or the devil. If 
we cannot, through the use of rational criteria, understand the absolute 
worth of God's commands, then the only reason left us to adopt God's ends 
as our own is that God has power over our weal and our woe. Kant notes 
that if we do not think of God's will in moral terms, "the only remaining 
concept of the divine will is made up of the attributes of desire for glory and 
dominion combined with the awful conceptions of might and vengeance, 
and any system of ethics based on them would be directly opposed to mo-
rality.,,27 We would then have to think of ourselves as servile, only relating 
to God as the one who has power over us. This amounts to nothing less 
than idolatry. Kant notes that 
Though it does indeed sound dangerous, it is in no way reprehen-
sible to say that every human being creates a God jor himself, nay, 
must make himself such a God according to moral concepts (and 
must add those infinitely great attributes which characterize a 
27 Foundations of the Metap/rysics of Moral, 70 [443]. 
THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF KANT'S Enncs 199 
Being capable of exhibiting, in the world, an object commensurate 
with Himsel~, in order to honor in Him the One who created him. 
For in whatever manner a being has been made known to him by 
another and described as God, yea, even if such a being had ap-
peared to him (if this is possible), he must first of all compare this 
representation with his ideal in order to judge whether he is enti-
tled to regard it and to honor it as a divinity. Hence there can be 
no religion springing from revelation alone, i.e., without first pos-
iting that concept, in its purity, as a touchstone. Without this all 
reverence for God would be idolatry.28 
Without first presupposing morality as a touchstone for our understanding 
of God, we could not relate to God as the God of love, that is to say, as the 
One who really enters into communion with the other, and who makes this 
communion possible.29 To think of God only in terms of the one who has 
power over us would not only block the possibility of a true communica-
tion between God and the human being, it would leave each person locked 
in on her own private and subjective quest for happiness. For unless God's 
will is understood in terms of a universally communicable account of the 
good, it would be only such a quest, which by its very nature cannot move 
beyond the self and that which gratifies it, that would bind the individual to 
do the will of God Such a concept of God and how He relates to us thus 
precludes the possibility of self-transcendence. 
If an individual acts "out of love for God," or "out of a desire to do 
God's will," this way of formulating the matter leaves open the crucial ques-
tions of why God's will should be obeyed, or of why God should inspire our 
love. These questions can only be appropriately answered in terms of an a 
priori rational account of the good, with which God's will must be thought 
to conform. Only when such an account has been given can we justify why 
21lJmmanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits o/Reason Alone, trans. T.M. Greene and 
Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) 157 [6: 169]. 
29Kant tells us that "Godliness comprises two determinations of the moral disposition in 
relation to God: fear of God is this disposition in obedience to His commands from bounden 
duty (the duty of a subject), i.e., from respect for the law; love of God, on the other hand, is 
the disposition to obedience from one's free choice and from approval of the law (the duty of 
a son). Both involve, therefore, over and above morality, the concept of a supersensible Being 
provided with the attributes which are requisite to the carrying out of that highest good 
which is aimed at by morality but which transcends our powers" (ibid., 170 [6: 183]). 
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doing the will of God should be of value to us. If Kant is correct, which I 
believe he is, then we cannot relate properly to God unless we have already 
grasped the worth of the second great commandment.3D 
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